Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”

Per Fredriksson and Jim Wollscheid

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010, vol. 112, issue 3, 489-513

Abstract: We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01618.x

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