Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games

Ronald Peeters, Marc Vorsatz and Markus Walzl

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 115, issue 2, 508-548

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games (2011)
Working Paper: Truth, trust, and sanctions: on institutional selection in sender-receiver games (2007)
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