Truth, trust, and sanctions: on institutional selection in sender-receiver games

Ronald Peeters, Marc Vorsatz and Markus Walzl

No 34, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2007-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1250 ... d69dfd5-ASSET1.0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games (2013)
Working Paper: Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2007034

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2007034

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().