Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Antonio Acconcia, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo () and Patrick Rey

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2014, vol. 116, issue 4, 1116-1159

Abstract: We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
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