Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Patrick Rey, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo () and Antonio Acconcia

No 9543, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

Keywords: Accomplice-witness; Criminal organizations; Leniency; Whistleblowing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
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