Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy

Alexander Kemnitz and Marcel Thum

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 117, issue 1, 220-247

Abstract: The birth of children often shifts the balance of power within a family. If family decisions are made according to the welfare function of the spouses, this shift in power might cause a time-consistency problem. In a model of cooperative family decision-making, we show that this problem can lead to a systematic downward bias in fertility. By keeping fertility low, spouses mitigate the ex ante undesired shift in the balance of power that results from the presence of children. This provides scope for welfare-enhancing policy intervention. We discuss to what extent existing family policy measures are suitable for overcoming the bias.

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Gender power, fertility, and family policy (2013)
Working Paper: Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy (2013)
Working Paper: Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy (2012)
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