Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy

Alexander Kemnitz and Marcel Thum

No 3798, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The birth of children often shifts the power balance within a family. If family decisions are made according to the spouses’ welfare function, this shift in power may lead to a time consistency problem. The allocation of resources after the birth of children may differ from the ex-ante optimal choice. In a model of cooperative decision making within a family, we show that this time consistency problem leads to a systematic downward bias in fertility choices. By keeping fertility low, families try to mitigate the ex-ante undesired shift in the power balance. This bias in fertility choices provides scope for welfare enhancing policy intervention. We discuss the extent to which existing measures in family policy are suitable to overcome the fertility bias.

Keywords: fertility; family policy; household allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H31 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy (2015)
Working Paper: Gender power, fertility, and family policy (2013)
Working Paper: Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3798

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