Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment
Björn Jahnke and
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2019, vol. 66, issue 3, 434-458
Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.
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Working Paper: Does the Reliability of Institutions Affect Public Good Contributions? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:66:y:2019:i:3:p:434-458
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