Does the Reliability of Institutions Affect Public Good Contributions? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Bjoern Jahnke and
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that "the system" had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that only learned that the attempt did not affect their payoffs or that were not at all exposed to corruption.
Keywords: Public goods; Experiment; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment (2019)
Working Paper: Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-570
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Heidrich, Christian ().