Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox

Luc Arrondel, Richard Duhautois and Jean‐François Laslier

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 72, issue 4

Abstract: The paper studies a very simple game‐theoretical model of sports competition such as the European football leagues. In this oligopoly‐type context, the Cournot‐Nash equilibrium reveals a paradoxical differentiation between clubs: those that include not only profit but also sporting performance in their objectives end up generating more profit than others who purely maximize profit.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.70014

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Working Paper: Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox (2025)
Working Paper: Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox (2025)
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