The Chief Justice as Effective Administrative Leader: The Impact of Policy Scope and Interbranch Relations

Richard L. Vining, Teena Wilhelm and David A. Hughes

Social Science Quarterly, 2019, vol. 100, issue 4, 1358-1368

Abstract: Objectives We examine the conditions under which the Chief Justice of the United States achieves congressional approval for his requests for institutional reforms to the federal courts. Specifically, we investigate whether legislators are more likely to enact these requests when they are limited in scope and members of Congress are similar ideologically to the chief justice or federal judiciary. Methods Our analysis uses the chief justice's Year‐End Report on the Federal Judiciary to identify reform proposals requested by the federal judiciary. Results We find that the likelihood that the federal judiciary achieves reform goals is conditioned by policy scope and ideological congruence with Congress. Conclusions We conclude that congressional administration of the federal courts is politically strategic.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:100:y:2019:i:4:p:1358-1368

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