Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics

Bimal Adhikari

Social Science Quarterly, 2019, vol. 100, issue 5, 1523-1539

Abstract: Objective This article explores the influence of aid recipient countries’ U.N. General Assembly voting on the amount of government‐to‐government economic assistance they receive from donor countries. I argue that major power donor states are swayed by recipient states’ voting records, while minor donors do not take U.N. General Assembly voting into consideration while formulating their aid policies. Method To explore the relationship, I utilize newly available, disaggregated foreign aid data. Result I find considerable empirical support for the assertion that dissimilar voting in the U.N. General Assembly results in less government‐to‐government aid from major power donors but has no effects on aid provided by minor power donors. Conclusion The findings show that foreign aid policies are based on donor countries’ position in the international system, where major power donors base their aid decisions mostly on strategic goals; minor power donors, on the other hand, prioritize recipient needs while formulating their foreign aid policies.

Date: 2019
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