From Statehouse to Courthouse: Legislative Professionalism and High Court Auditing Behavior

Miles T. Armaly

Social Science Quarterly, 2020, vol. 101, issue 1, 362-375

Abstract: Objectives The objective of this article is to determine whether the institutional resources available to state legislatures impact the cases that a state's court of last resort chooses to hear. Specifically, does legislative professionalism influence the number of cases the court audits that reference an act of the legislature? Method I use time‐series cross‐sectional analysis to examine over 10,000 cases for 44 state courts from 1998 to 2009. Results I find that courts of last resort in states low in legislative professionalism tend to hear a greater number of cases that reference the legislature than states higher in professionalism, even after controlling for confounders such as ideological disagreement and judicial resources. Conclusion This suggests that state supreme courts offer themselves a disproportionate influence in public policy in states with low professionalism legislatures relative to those with lawmakers more capable of authoring litigation‐proof legislation.

Date: 2020
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