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The Electoral Choices of Voters with Coalition‐Straddling Consideration Sets

Jacob Sohlberg and Annika Fredén

Social Science Quarterly, 2020, vol. 101, issue 4, 1303-1313

Abstract: Objectives Preelectoral party coalitions are common in multiparty systems. We examine the proposition that individuals who choose between parties from competing coalitions think and behave differently compared to those who only consider voting for parties of the same coalition. Part of the reason, we suggest, is that coalition‐straddling voters play a key role in deciding who forms government. Methods We rely on data from a multiwave panel with thousands of participants collected during two election campaigns in Sweden. Statistical regression techniques are used to analyze the data. Results We find that citizens who straddle opposing coalitions think that the vote decision is harder and rely more on voting advice applications. Moreover, the evidence suggests that their ultimate vote choice is more consequential in how they view parties. Conclusion Coalition‐straddling influences political behavior. The evidence is largely in line with the notion that coalition‐straddling individuals are aware of their importance.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12813

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