The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock: Analyzing Divided Government Through the Lens of Majority Rule

William Bianco and Regina Smyth

Social Science Quarterly, 2020, vol. 101, issue 5, 1712-1727

Abstract: Objective It is widely argued that a primary source of legislative deadlock in America is the combination of a secular increase in polarization, combined with constitutional provisions that divide law‐making power across branches. We argue that polarization affects productivity, but only given a particular pattern of divided government. We distinguish between split branches, where a president from one party faces a Congress controlled by the other, and split chambers, where each party controls one house of Congress. Methods Multivariate analysis of enactment data from post‐War Congresses, augmented by data on House and Senate Uncovered Sets. Results Enactments of major legislation are less likely given split chambers compared to the other options and polarization has no impact after controlling for these factors. Conclusion These results redefine the conditions under which polarization drives deadlock. They also explain why the increase in polarization over the last two decades has until recently had little impact on major enactments.

Date: 2020
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