Preferential Trade Agreements, Democracy, and the Risk of Coups d’état

Wen‐Chin Wu and Fangjin Ye

Social Science Quarterly, 2020, vol. 101, issue 5, 1834-1849

Abstract: Objectives We seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d’état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challengers’ incentives to initiate coups. In addition, the effect of PTAs is larger in democracies because democratic signatories are perceived to be more credible in upholding treaty commitments than their authoritarian counterparts. Methods We employ binary time‐series cross‐sectional (BTSCS) models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1960 and 2012. Results We find that signing PTAs reduces risks of coups, especially in countries with higher levels of democratic development. Conclusions Our study sheds light on how PTAs can prolong leader survival through reducing the likelihood of coups and contributes to emerging studies on the consequences of signing PTAs in the age of economic globalization.

Date: 2020
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