Patterns of (party competition in) democracy: Voter certainty and party strategy in different institutional settings

Gidong Kim

Social Science Quarterly, 2023, vol. 104, issue 4, 605-618

Abstract: Objectives While some argue that parties reduce voter uncertainty to attract more votes, others claim that parties increase vote shares when beclouding their policy positions. To address the puzzle, I argue that as the degree of consensual characteristics increases, strategic uncertainty is electorally more helpful because parties in consensus models should consider the governing coalition and facilitate cooperation with other parties due to multiparty systems. Methods Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I employ multilevel modeling to analyze 335 parties in 32 countries including both advanced and postcommunist democracies. Results I find empirical evidence that as the political institutions have more consensus models, it is more beneficial (or less costly at least) for parties to pursue voter uncertainty with broad appealing strategies primarily in advanced democracies. Conclusion The findings suggest that democratic institutional settings shape the incentives for parties to adopt either broad or narrow appeals in the context of party competition.

Date: 2023
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