Campaign Finance Laws and the Competition for Spending in Gubernatorial Elections*

Kedron Bardwell

Social Science Quarterly, 2003, vol. 84, issue 4, 811-825

Abstract: Objective. The diversity of campaign finance laws in the U.S. states allows the effects of these reforms to be measured. I investigate the impact of contribution limits and public financing on campaign spending in gubernatorial elections. Methods. I conduct a multivariate regression analysis of general election spending in races for governor from 1980 to 2000. I analyze levels of spending per voter, as well as challengers' share of total spending. Results. State contribution limits do not hold down overall spending. Candidate acceptance of public funding and spending limits reduces spending by incumbent governors more than it reduces that of challengers. As for challengers' share of spending, I find that public funding programs improve challengers' ability to match incumbents' spending dollar for dollar. Conclusions. State programs that offer public funding to candidates effectively favor challengers. This points to the potential of these reforms to make federal elections more competitive.

Date: 2003
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0038-4941.2003.08404003.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:84:y:2003:i:4:p:811-825

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0038-4941

Access Statistics for this article

Social Science Quarterly is currently edited by Robert L. Lineberry

More articles in Social Science Quarterly from Southwestern Social Science Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().