Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race‐to‐the‐Bottom Thesis*
Neal D. Woods
Social Science Quarterly, 2006, vol. 87, issue 1, 174-189
Objective. This study assesses the effect of interstate competition on the stringency with which states enforce environmental regulations. Method. Pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of state surface‐mining regulation is used to determine if the enforcement gap between a state and competitor states affects the stringency of state enforcement. Results. The results suggest that state enforcement is systematically affected by the behavior of regional competitors. States adjust their enforcement in response to competitor states when their enforcement stringency exceeds that of their competitors. When competitors' enforcement is more stringent, however, their behavior does not have a significant effect. Conclusion. This study provides empirical evidence for a race to the bottom in state environmental regulation.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:87:y:2006:i:1:p:174-189
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0038-4941
Access Statistics for this article
Social Science Quarterly is currently edited by Robert L. Lineberry
More articles in Social Science Quarterly from Southwestern Social Science Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().