 Collateral Consequences of a Collateral Penalty: The Negative Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on the Political Participation of Nonfelons*Melanie Bowers and Robert R. Preuhs Social Science Quarterly, 2009, vol. 90, issue 3, 722-743 Abstract: Objective. Felon disenfranchisement (FD) policies are said to not only prohibit (ex)felons from voting, but also reduce the political influence of particular groups that are most affected by FD laws. This study tests several hypotheses regarding the role of socialization on individual‐level political participation to examine the claims that nonfelons' probability of voting is reduced by strict FD laws. Methods. The study uses multilevel modeling and two separate individual‐level data sets of those registered to vote to examine the effect of FD laws on the probability of voting. Results. The findings demonstrate that strict FD laws reduce the probability of voting for blacks, but not whites, while the results are mixed for several other demographic groups. Conclusions. Beyond the direct removal of ex‐felons from the voter pool, FD policy can undermine the mechanism of political socialization, leading to potentially greater biases in the electoral arena than previously thought. Date: 2009 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:90:y:2009:i:3:p:722-743 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Social Science Quarterly is currently edited by Robert L. Lineberry More articles in Social Science Quarterly from Southwestern Social Science Association |
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