Politics, Pragmatism, and Departures from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1954–2004*

Richard L. Vining

Social Science Quarterly, 2009, vol. 90, issue 4, 834-853

Abstract: Objective. This article uses Cox proportional hazards models to explain departures from the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1954–2004. I argue that reforms to pension eligibility and financial incentives in 1984 extended opportunities for voluntary departures and strategic behavior, and that reasons for quitting (whether political, personal, or institutional) differed among types of departures and over time. Methods. The data represent all judge‐years from 1954–2004. Both the full period and 1954–1983 and 1984–2004 subperiods are examined. Results. The effects of political factors are limited to partial retirements and suggest judges' recognition of contentious confirmation politics since the 1980s. Personal and institutional variables dominate outright departures. Conclusions. Explanations for departures from the circuit bench differ both by type and over time. Scholars and policymakers should refine arguments regarding judicial turnover and its causes.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2009.00665.x

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