How Rules Matter: Electoral Reform in Taiwan*

Hans Stockton

Social Science Quarterly, 2010, vol. 91, issue 1, 21-41

Abstract: Objectives. This article is a test of general electoral theory in the case of Taiwan's 2008, postreform legislative election. In light of Taiwan's electoral reform, I test several hypotheses related to choice in electoral design and winning conditions, effective number of parties, proportionality, and regionalism. Methods. I run a simulation of the new rules and districting using the previous (2004) election results and compare this to the actual results. By comparing simulated and actual outcomes, I can compare theoretically‐driven, a priori expectations with election outcomes. Results. Primary findings are that a dominant seat share for the Nationalist Party, decline in third‐party representation, and disproportionality were largely predicated on the transition to a majoritarian system. Conclusion. General electoral theory holds robust predictive power in the case of Taiwan.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00679.x

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