EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Locating the External Source of Enforceability: Alliances, Bilateral Investment Treaties, and Foreign Direct Investment

Zhiyuan Wang and Hyunjin Youn

Social Science Quarterly, 2018, vol. 99, issue 1, 80-96

Abstract: Objective We theorize that alliances play a role as an external source of enforceability of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and they do this by limiting the policy opportunism in foreign direct investment (FDI) host countries. We attempt to demonstrate that being party to common BITs and common alliances substantially raises the accumulation of FDI. Methods Using econometric techniques including panel‐corrected standard error, fixed effect, and dynamic pooled models, we analyze panel data on dyadic FDI stock from 1978 to 2003. Results We find that BITs increase FDI stock and that alliances magnify this positive effect of BITs by a substantial margin. Conclusion Being embedded in alliances strengthens the impact of BITs on FDI. This study contributes to the extant literature on the efficacy of BITs in particular and that on international institutions in general.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12412

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:socsci:v:99:y:2018:i:1:p:80-96

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0038-4941

Access Statistics for this article

Social Science Quarterly is currently edited by Robert L. Lineberry

More articles in Social Science Quarterly from Southwestern Social Science Association
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:99:y:2018:i:1:p:80-96