Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes

Sydney Finkelstein and Donald C. Hambrick

Strategic Management Journal, 1989, vol. 10, issue 2, 121-134

Abstract: A model of the determinants of chief executive (CEO) compensation is presented and tested. Based on a sample from the leisure industry, the study finds that CEO pay has complex links to several factors: firm size, complexity, performance, CEO power, board vigilance, and the CEO's human capital. The study includes a separate examination of CEO salary and bonus, as well as a test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) ownership categories.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (150)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250100203

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:10:y:1989:i:2:p:121-134

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0143-2095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().