Toward a theory of competitive market signaling: A research agenda

Oliver Heil and Thomas S. Robertson

Strategic Management Journal, 1991, vol. 12, issue 6, 403-418

Abstract: Competitive market signals are conceptualized as announcements or previews of potential actions intended to convey or to gain information from competitors. This paper develops a set of propositions based on research in economics, social psychology, and marketing on the risk/reward trade‐off in signaling, the receiver's signal interpretation, and the receiver's reaction alternatives. The overall objective is to develop a research agenda toward a theory of competitive market signaling.

Date: 1991
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