 Competitive attack, retaliation and performance: An expectancy‐valence frameworkMing‐Jer Chen and Danny Miller Strategic Management Journal, 1994, vol. 15, issue 2, 85-102 Abstract: This research examines how competitive attacks can best reduce the chances of retaliation. An expectancy–valence model is developed that views retaliation as a function of the subtlety of an attack: that is, its visibility, the difficulty rivals might have in responding to it in kind, and the importance or ‘centrality’ to rivals of the market under siege. Motivational theories suggest that all three of these independent variables need to be in place in order to elicit a response—or conversely, that low visibility, substantial response difficulty, or minimal centrality would each by itself be enough to prevent retaliation. This notion was not supported. Each one of the independent variables could serve as the ‘weak link of the chain,’ increasing the chances of retaliation. However, as predicted by expectancy theory, these variables selectively demonstrated some interactions that compound the threat of retaliation. In combination, high visibility and low levels of difficulty were especially likely to evoke responses from rivals. Finally, there appears to be a real incentive to avoid retaliation given its negative associations with performance. Date: 1994 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:15:y:1994:i:2:p:85-102 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell |
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