AGENCY CONFLICT AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: THE EFFECT OF DIVESTMENT ON CORPORATE VALUE

Peter Wright and Stephen P. Ferris

Strategic Management Journal, 1997, vol. 18, issue 1, 77-83

Abstract: Among the various stakeholders of a firm, senior managers are the most likely targets for private and public political pressures. Other stakeholder groups are less visible and may be perceived as less influential in corporate strategy formulation and implementation. In some situations, consequently, senior executives may adopt corporate strategies in response to political pressures even if these strategies may be costly to shareholders. In this study, a special case is examined: the effect of divestment of South African business units on firm value. Using data from 1984 through 1990, we examine the impact that announcements of divestments have upon the stock return behavior of publicly traded firms. Our results indicate that significant and negative excess returns accrue to shares of companies announcing divestments of South African operations. These results are supportive of the premise that noneconomic pressures may influence managerial strategies rather than value‐enhancement goals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199701)18:13.0.CO;2-R

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