WEALTH CREATION AND BID RESISTANCE IN U.K. TAKEOVER BIDS

Peter Holl and Dimitris Kyriazis ()

Strategic Management Journal, 1997, vol. 18, issue 6, 483-498

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the determinants of, and relationship between, wealth creation and bid resistance for a sample of 178 successful takeover bids in the U.K. Within the context of an event study approach we test a range of hypotheses against a background that recognizes the existence of agency conflict and the role of corporate governance mechanisms designed to mitigate its effect. The results obtained are interpreted within the context of the U.K. corporate environment. We find that wealth creation and bid resistance are mutually dependent on each other. We find evidence suggesting the presence of managerial and financial synergy but the absence of operational synergy. Our results also suggest that there is some conflict between managers and shareholders but that significant monitoring is exercised by the particular governance mechanisms we investigate. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199706)18:63.0.CO;2-6

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:483-498

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0143-2095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().