Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

Michael L. Magnan and Sylvie St‐onge

Strategic Management Journal, 1997, vol. 18, issue 7, 573-581

Abstract: This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry‐specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199708)18:73.0.CO;2-K

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