Empirical organizational‐level examinations of agency and collaborative predictions of performance‐contingent compensation

Jason D. Shaw, Nina Gupta and John E. Delery

Strategic Management Journal, 2000, vol. 21, issue 5, 611-623

Abstract: Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance‐contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within‐industry (trucking) sample and in a cross‐industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2000
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