Succession planning vs. agency theory: a test of Harris and Helfat's interpretation of plurality announcement market returns

Wallace N. Davidson, Carol Nemec and Dan L. Worrell

Strategic Management Journal, 2001, vol. 22, issue 2, 179-184

Abstract: In this note we respond to Harris and Helfat's (1998) reinterpretation of the results in Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997). Harris and Helfat argued that the negative stock market response associated with plurality announcements could be the result of inadequate corporate succession planning rather than with the agency cost explanation. Our results, here, show that duality and plurality announcements do not hurt shareholder wealth as long as there is an heir apparent and, therefore, are more consistent with the succession planning explanation than with agency theory. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2001
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