Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources

Rodolphe Durand and Vicente Vargas

Strategic Management Journal, 2003, vol. 24, issue 7, 667-675

Abstract: The principal–agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non‐listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 × 2 framework distinguishing owner‐controlled vs. agent‐led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2003
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