Incumbent pricing responses to entry

Daniel Simon

Strategic Management Journal, 2005, vol. 26, issue 13, 1229-1248

Abstract: Empirical research on incumbent pricing responses to new entry has yielded mixed results. Some studies find that incumbents cut prices post entry, while others find that incumbents accommodate entry by leaving prices unchanged (or even raising prices). To better understand these findings, this study explores the conditions under which incumbents are more likely to cut prices when faced with entry. I argue that incumbents vary in their incentives to cut prices; incumbents with greater incentives are more likely to respond aggressively to entry. Using data on magazine subscription prices, I find that, on average, incumbent magazines do not reduce prices following entry. But, the results suggest that newer incumbents cut prices more than older incumbents, while incumbents that compete in fewer and in more competitive markets cut prices less following entry. These results help to explain inconsistent empirical results in the literature, and support a more general explanation of when firms respond aggressively to entry: incumbents respond to entry more aggressively when their incentives to do so are greater. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
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