Antitrust holdup source, cross‐national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context

Joseph Clougherty

Strategic Management Journal, 2005, vol. 26, issue 8, 769-790

Abstract: Managers are increasingly uncertain over the source (home nation or foreign nation) of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers with significant international implications. I propose a conceptual framework that predicts the source of antitrust holdup for domestic mergers. I find an industry's global competitiveness to be the primary driver behind holdup source. Further, I factor institutional conditions to yield more precise predictions tailored to the cross‐national environment for antitrust policy. Exploratory empirical tests based on the merger policies of 27 antitrust jurisdictions over the 1992–2000 period provide support for baseline predictions. Finally, I generate prescriptive propositions that yield implications for effective political strategies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.473

Related works:
Working Paper: Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:769-790

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0143-2095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().