Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking

Peter Wright, Mark Kroll, Jeffrey A. Krug and Michael Pettus

Strategic Management Journal, 2007, vol. 28, issue 1, 81-89

Abstract: In our work, the influences on subsequent firm risk taking of fixed incentives relative to variable incentives as well as the separate effects on subsequent corporate risk taking of variable incentives are examined. Focusing on the top management team members, we find a higher proportion of incentives that are devoted to fixed incentives relative to variable incentives tend to be inversely associated with subsequent firm risk taking. Managerial stock options are directly and uniformly associated with subsequent corporate risk taking. Executive shareholdings, however, display a curvilinear relationship with subsequent enterprise risk taking. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2007
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