Licensing‐in fosters rapid invention! the effect of the grant‐back clause and technological unfamiliarity

Maria Isabella Leone and Toke Reichstein ()

Strategic Management Journal, 2012, vol. 33, issue 8, 965-985

Abstract: Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing‐in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non‐licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant‐back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant‐back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2012
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