Competition, governance, and relationship‐specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy

Nan Jia

Strategic Management Journal, 2013, vol. 34, issue 13, 1551-1567

Abstract: This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship‐specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general‐purpose product or a relationship‐specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship‐specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship‐specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship‐specific assets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2077

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:34:y:2013:i:13:p:1551-1567

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0143-2095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().