Increased non‐family ownership in family‐owned firms: How does it affect CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity?

Shuping Li

Strategic Management Journal, 2018, vol. 39, issue 13, 3434-3457

Abstract: Research Summary: This article investigates the impact of the increase in non‐family ownership in family‐owned firms on CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity. Longitudinal analyses based on 717 family‐owned Taiwanese public firms from 1997 to 2011 demonstrate a positive relationship between CEO turnover and poor firm financial performance (or CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity). This positive relationship is stronger when non‐family ownership is higher in the firms. Further, the positive effect of non‐family ownership on CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is stronger when the lack of governance transparency or a higher deviation between control rights and cash flow rights enables entrenchment of families. The study contributes to the family business literature while also exploring the implications of corporate governance, particularly on CEO turnover. Managerial Summary: Corporate control in many economies, including emerging markets, has gradually transitioned from a family‐dominated structure to one with substantial non‐family ownership. How does the increase of non‐family ownership influence the monitoring effectiveness in family‐owned firms? To address this question, this study assesses the impact of non‐family ownership on CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity and its boundary conditions among 717 family‐owned firms in Taiwan from 1997 to 2011. The findings show that CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity increases with non‐family ownership, especially in firms with weak governance conditions. The study highlights the key role of non‐family owners for the best corporate governance design.

Date: 2018
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