Corporate vulnerability to cash tender offers

George W. Gallinger

Strategic Management Journal, 1982, vol. 3, issue 3, 179-196

Abstract: This paper reports and discusses empirical results of a study which examines why some firms are attacked via unfriendly tender offers and other firms are not. The evidence indicates that target firms' managers ineffectively plan and/or implement business strategy, thus increasing their vulnerability to takeovers.

Date: 1982
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