Product diversification, performance criteria and compensation at the corporate manager level

Nancy Knox Napier and Mark Smith

Strategic Management Journal, 1987, vol. 8, issue 2, 195-201

Abstract: The paper describes a test of the Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) model of stages of development. In particular, Galbraith and Nathanson hypothesized that in highly diverse firms: (1) performance criteria are more objective, (2) bonus is a larger proportion of total compensation, and (3) bonus allocation decisions are based more on an objective ‘formula’ of performance evaluation than on the discretion of the firm President or Chief Executive Officer. The study compared the three variables across three diversification groups (high, medium, low), based on Rumelt's (1974) classification (single product, vertically integrated, dominant, related, unrelated, and conglomerate). The study used written surveys of corporate managers in Fortune 1000 manufacturing firms.

Date: 1987
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