Why Sentencing Codification Could be More Complex than Anticipated

Nuno Garoupa

Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 15, issue 2, 221-229

Abstract: The common argument to explain codification of criminal sanctions is departing from arbitrary sentencing. By limiting judicial discretion, sentencing codification should reduce disparity. By a simple theoretical model, we show that strategic judicial behavior can actually undermine statutory sentencing, thus producing more rather than less variance in severity of punishment.

Keywords: judicial discretion; sentencing codification; strategic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2023-0173

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