Identities in the Commons: The Dynamics of Norms and Social Capital

Erwin Bulte and Richard Horan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Christian Allen Vossler

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 35

Abstract: This paper provides a formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation in the management of common property resources. We develop a dynamic model that includes moral norms or a sense of 'identity,' and show that cooperation may - but need not - be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of intervention by a managing agency or punishment by peers. We demonstrate that outside intervention has ambiguous effects when identity matters - it may reduce welfare of the agents harvesting the stock.

Keywords: internalization of moral norms; changing preferences; social capital; regulating common pools (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2372 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:13

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejeap/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2372

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().