Competition and Welfare Effects of VAT Exemptions

Helmut Dietl, Christian Jaag, Markus Lang and Urs Trinkner

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2011, vol. 11, issue 1, 29

Abstract: Distortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise partly from the exemption of specific services and sectors. This paper develops an analytical model that is applicable to any sector characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions of services and activities. We analyze the effects of such asymmetric tax regimes on market shares, optimal prices, tax receipts, and social welfare. The analytical model shows how asymmetric VAT exemptions distort competition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. The net effect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of VAT-rated inputs versus the fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate main competitive impacts of VAT policies, while showing their consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results based on a calibrated quantitative model of a selected sector. Our paper provides guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between a level playing field in the market, consumer surplus, and government tax revenue.

Keywords: value-added tax; indirect taxes; regulation; tax exemption; social welfare; competitive effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and Welfare Effects of VAT Exemptions (2010)
Working Paper: Competition and Welfare Effects of VAT Exemptions (2010)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2855

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