Public Education, Accountability, and Yardstick Competition in a Federal System

Philipp Mandel () and Bernd Süssmuth

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2015, vol. 15, issue 4, 1679-1703

Abstract: Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.

Keywords: yardstick competition; public education; VP functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 H77 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0090 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Public education, accountability, and yardstick competition in a federal system (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:15:y:2015:i:4:p:1679-1703:n:8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejeap/html

DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0090

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().