Public Outcry and Police Behavior

Gregory DeAngelo and Bryan McCannon

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, vol. 16, issue 2, 619-645

Abstract: Numerous empirical studies have documented policing behavior and response to public opinion, social norms, changing laws, neighborhood context and a litany of other subject areas. What is missing from this literature is a general theoretical framework that explains the conflicting goals of properly applying the law and responding to social norms and the consequences of the law. We build a theoretical framework where law enforcement officials care about both reputation and performance. Outside evaluations assess the quality of the decision making of the officers, but can be influenced by strategic challenging of the sanctioning by the suspected violators. We first establish that reputational concerns can distort law enforcement, encouraging either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law, depending on the prior beliefs of violations and the observed signal. Introducing strategic challenging by the violator eliminates over-enforcement and allows for an even larger reduction in application of the law by less-skilled officers. Connections to empirical findings of distortions in law enforcement, along with an extension to deterrence are highlighted.

Keywords: enforcement; monitoring errors; strategic challenging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0101

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