Regulations to Supplement Weak Environmental Liability

Calcott Paul ()
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Calcott Paul: Victoria University of Wellington, 23 Lambton Quay, Wellington 6140, New Zealand

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, vol. 16, issue 4, 14

Abstract: Liability for environmental harm is often capped when precaution meets a minimum requirement and is often applied in conjunction with regulations. The correct setting for such regulations depends on the approach that courts take to evaluating the minimum requirement. It may also depend on which of the minimum requirement and capped liability is the more pressing consideration for the firm. Regulatory design is more straightforward when it is capped liability that is more pressing.

Keywords: liability; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0172

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