Delinquency Reinforcement and Balance: Is Exposure to Delinquent Peers Always Risky?

James Charles Joni S. and Yao-Yu Chih
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James Charles Joni S.: Department of Finance & Economics, McCoy College of Business Administration, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2016, vol. 16, issue 4, 30

Abstract: This study investigates whether exposure to delinquent peers increases the risk of committing delinquent acts. To incorporate a balance argument in a conventional setting, we develop an adjusted exposure level to study an individual’s delinquency choice. We show this choice is affected by not only how many delinquent peers an individual directly and indirectly connects with, but also who those peers are. Specifically, exposure to delinquent peers is not universally risky, and could even be protective if the average exposure level of the individual’s delinquent peers is significantly less than her own exposure level. In addition, we show that individuals with high exposure levels are more sensitive to structural changes in the delinquent network. Therefore, a policy aiming to isolate key players in the network could be more cost-effective than strengthening the law-enforcement system.

Keywords: economics of crime; balance argument; delinquent network; relative risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D85 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0224

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