Performance, Luck and Equality: An Experimental Analysis of Subjects’ Preferences for Different Allocation Criteria

Leonardo Becchetti, Giacomo Degli Antoni (), Ottone Stefania () and Solferino Nazaria
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Ottone Stefania: Econometica, Inter-University Center for Economic Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126Milano, Italy
Solferino Nazaria: Department of Economics Law and Institutions, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via Columbia 2, 00133, Roma, Italy

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, issue 1, 14

Abstract: We perform an experimental analysis to investigate participants’ choices of allocative criteria under different conditions. We document that performance-based criteria guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base are widely preferred by both neutral spectators and stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, although popularity among stakeholders is mostly due to self-interest considerations and optimism concerning their expected performance. Information regarding the distribution of payoffs under different criteria dramatically reduces such choice because the self-interest motive directly emerges, and most players opt to revise their decision in favor of the criterion maximizing their own payoff.

Keywords: fairness; justice; performance; equality; luck (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2016-0259

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