Editor Reputation and Journal Quality: The Case of Regional Economic Association Journals
Joao Faria (),
Frank Mixon and
Kamal Upadhyaya ()
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, issue 1, 20
This study provides a formal game that explores how editor reputation and rent seeking play a part in scholarly research that involves regional economic association journals. The game asserts that a regional economic association journal’s reputation is determined by the academic reputation of its editor, the academic reputation of the department wherein the journal is housed, and, among other things, rent seeking by scholars. Evidence from the two most prominent regional economic association journals in the United States, namely Economic Inquiry and the Southern Economic Journal, generally support these aspects of the formal game.
Keywords: scientometrics; economics journals and editors; game theory; economics scholarship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C60 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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