 Public–Private MonopolyThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 15 Abstract: This article presents comparative statics of organizational modes of natural monopoly in public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private monopoly lowers output and increases the price to maximize profit; public monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how; and a regulated monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A public–private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and public residual control rights. Public–private partnerships support higher prices than marginal costs due to rent sharing, with its upper price frontier decreasing in private residual control rights. Keywords: natural monopolies; operating efficiency; public–private partnerships; organization structure; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:18:y:2018:i:2:p:15:n:1 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter |
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